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June 22nd, 2009 | Filed under: Essay, Philosophyne Previous: Introduction, Right to Privacy (part 1), (part 2), (part 3)
Outside of the important work to legally refine privacy and our freedoms for information, it is important to improve the sense of what privacy is in itself. If we have a good working notion of what is private and whose expectations are the most important in protecting and sharing private information, we should be able to rehabilitate privacy from its confrontational sense. Legal work needs this domain of privacy-as-discord to develop the concept publicly, but we can also improve the private sense of privacy. If what we regard as fundamentally private is information on our states of being, then describing it outside of any conflict is worthwhile pursuing.
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June 15th, 2009 | Filed under: Essay, Philosophyne Previous: Introduction, Right to Privacy (part 1), (part 2)
It seems there are two kinds of particular private details that we value: Information on our movements and information on our states of being. Since the end game is a legal definition, there doesn’t need to be a lot of nuance as to how we understand the enactment of a right to privacy. But we should see that data on our public movements ought to be differentiated from how we feel, and from information that signifies our mental states and histories.
June 8th, 2009 | Filed under: Essay, Philosophyne Previous: Introduction, Right to Privacy (part 1)
Confidential information can be generalized into isolated judgments or datum instead of long-term opinions or presumptions. The distinction is dependant upon how we highlight individual data points of people to be representative of themselves versus a private analysis of their behaviors or histories to predict their future decisions. We regard specific facts as confidential information that is kept by the individual to help form and abbreviate their identity. The analysis and further generalization of these facts is most often produced by organizations, which collect and predict the reactions people will have in their efforts to affirm some self-worth. Both types of confidential information contain judgments, but the point of interest for a right to privacy is that the proprietary studies of organizations who rely on the collection of private data of individuals maintain this information only for themselves. People always share, or can share their opinions and decisions, but the forecasted trends made from the confidential information of these judgments by organizations is disturbing when they are not accessible for inspection and corroboration.
June 3rd, 2009 | Filed under: Essay, Philosophyne Introduction to Essay
Privacy, if it is a human right, is legally difficult to identify. There are ongoing efforts to develop the arguments for its limits and protections, but there is a strong assumption in the U.S. and Canada that generally citizens have some right to privacy. Neither the Canadian Bill of Rights nor the Charter of Rights and Freedoms mention privacy directly, but it may be inferred through the right to substantive liberty (charter s. 7).1 The main legal justifications are the current privacy acts at the Federal and Provincial levels. Where the provinces have authority over property and civil rights (s.92, constitution act (1867)) they have the central responsibility for privacy. Yet, when the issues are national, for example, in broadcasting or security, then the Federal government can regulate privacy.
May 25th, 2009 | Filed under: Essay, Philosophyne
In October of 2003, Canada had the inconvenient fun of having to compare two competing indulgences. On the one hand, there was the right of Parliamentary committees to summon and investigate all Federal organizations, whether they reported to Parliament directly or not. And on the other, the right of the then Privacy Commissioner to keep his discretionary spending of public funds private. Absurdity won. But curiously, it was the Commissioner’s perverse spending that rankled Canadians. His chicanery to deny the public the right to review the office of their own privacy ombudsman seemed overlooked.
This reaction nicely typifies the confusion surrounding the concept of privacy, but it also damages the case that it ought to be esteemed as a fundamental freedom. The scandal encourages the prejudice that privacy is something more synonymous with guile than personal freedom; namely, if there’s nothing to hide, why not provide? Unfortunately, there seems to be few alternatives, since the dominant opposing argument can be found in the rebuttal of the ersatz Commissioner to Parliament; that is, there’s nothing to provide, since it’s the individual’s right to hide.
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